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 1 Introduction
In many European countries we ﬁnd schemes of ad hoc governmental relief for the recovery
of losses from natural hazards in co-existence with market-based natural hazard insurance.
Basic rational choice theory tells us that both schemes are substitutes from the standpoint
of the recipient so that a crowding out of private insurance can be expected. This eﬀect
has been called ’charity hazard’ in the literature (Browne & Hoyt 2000). The empirical
proof of ’charity hazard’ has been diﬃcult though. In several studies of low insurance
density, co-existing governmental relief programs are not showing a signiﬁcant demand
decreasing impact. This divergence between theoretical predictions and empirical ﬁndings
leads us to expect that some important variables for insurance demand and governmental
relief so far have been omitted. One missing variable, particularly addressed in this
paper, are the institutional features or the ’design’ of governmental relief programs. Often
these programs do not coincide with the basic promise to help people in need. Rather
they are ad hoc, depending on political circumstances such as election years (Garrett
& Sobel 2003). In addition, they are incomplete, thus only providing a small share
of the actual damage. Uncertain and incomplete governmental relief programs could
therefore co-exist with private insurance without a crowding out eﬀect to be observed.
This is the guiding hypothesis in this paper. We empirically test the hypothesis that
an assured partial relief scheme (as we ﬁnd in Austria) drives a stronger crowding out
of private insurance, or ’charity hazard’, than an uncertain scheme of full relief that we
ﬁnd in Germany. Our overall ﬁnding is that the design of governmental relief programs
signiﬁcantly impacts private substitute markets if aid from these programs can be relied
upon ex ante.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we provide a literature review
followed by an institutional analysis of the Austrian catastrophe fund and the German
ad hoc system of governmental relief in section 3. Our theoretical model is explained
2in section 4. Data, estimation method and results are presented in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Survey of Literature
Governmental ﬁnancial assistance to the victims of natural hazards is a common feature
in Europe and the United States (e.g. Stripple 1998, Schwarze & Wagner 2004, Pretten-
thaler, Hyll & Vetters 2004, Kunreuther 2006, Michel-Kerjan & Kousky 2010). While
clearly needed by victims of mega events (such as the current Haiti earthquake), this
type of ad hoc intervention is heavily criticized as a potential cause for crowding out of
private demand for natural hazard insurance (Raschky & Weck-Hannemann 2007). The
problem of ’charity hazard’ (Browne & Hoyt 2000) emerges when individuals underinsure
or do not insure at all against certain losses because of expected governmental aid and/or
private charity. For simplicity reasons this paper focuses solely on governmental aid as
a source for ’charity hazard’. Basically charity hazard is just a special case of the moral
hazard problem. Browne & Hoyt (2000) deﬁne charity hazard as "[...] the tendency
of individuals not to insure themselves against possible natural disasters because they
believe help will be available, e.g. from friends, family, the municipality, charities or state
emergency programs." (p. 293) If individuals rely on external assistance private charity
and governmental ﬁnancial relief can be considered a premium-free insurance against nat-
ural disasters. The purchase of costly private insurance cover is therefore expected to be
discouraged. The low demand for natural disaster insurance also aﬀects the supply-side
of the market, the insurance companies. Some of the providers retreat from the market
because it is unproﬁtable to oﬀer insurance cover against natural hazards. The remaining
providers have to increase the premiums in order to cover costs. This leads to an even
lower supply at higher prices - a vicious cycle that has been called ’disaster syndrome’
(Kunreuther & Pauly 2004, Schwarze & Wagner 2004). In this situation fewer and fewer
individuals tend to insure against the risks from natural disasters and rely on governmen-
3tal aid in the case of emergency. Factual examples for governmental relief programs are
the European Union’s solidarity fund, the disaster assistance programs in several states
in the USA (e.g. California Disaster Assistance Act) or the Austrian catastrophe fund
(Katastrophenfonds).
It is perfectly rational behavior not to obtain insurance cover against potential losses,
when one can expect ﬁnancial support from the government in the case of natural dis-
asters (Coate 1995). Private insurance cover inﬂicts costs (search costs and premiums)
while the support from the government is available for free. The paradox of the situation
is that people often have no actual legal entitlement for any ﬁnancial relief by the govern-
ment. This suggests that the sheer existence of governmental relief funds, past personal
experience and/or media reports of past catastrophes and governmental aid seems to feed
the individuals’ belief that the government will provide ﬁnancial catastrophe assistance
as if they were insured. Prettenthaler et al. (2004) further argue that the societal legit-
imization to rely solely on governmental relief might result from the idea and/or belief
that (a) in general individuals cannot be made responsible for natural catastrophes and
their eﬀects, (b) the government has to restore social and economic order after an event
and (c) the low number of insured properties are not a fault of the victims, but also of
the government as it did not assure the proper supply of natural catastrophe insurances
and protective measures in general. In addition to this societal beliefs, an institution-
alization of governmental aid by politicians and the administration might even further
enforce the individuals’ anticipation for ﬁnancial assistance from the government. Such
an institutionalization can have various characteristics:
1. The creation of a catastrophe fund that not only provides ﬁnancial relief for one
speciﬁc event, but is also a persistent institution that grants ﬁnancial assistance for
disaster losses throughout the year.
2. The governmental aid has some sort of formalization and/or legal foundations such
as speciﬁc laws. These can be laws that explicitly deﬁne the ﬁnancial sources of the
4governmental relief and the way how the ﬁnancial assistance is distributed among
the victims in the case of a natural catastrophe.
3. The governmental relief is administrated by a special bureaucratic entity.
4. Even if there is no particular agency, oﬃce or person responsible for governmental
relief, the existence of guidelines that inform the individuals about how and where to
obtain governmental aid or speciﬁc application forms for ﬁnancial assistance might
enforce the belief in relief by the government.
This institutionalization can support the peoples’ anticipation of public charity and fur-
ther impede insurance attempts and thus the diﬀusion of natural hazard insurances.1
Theoretical Background
Governmental assistance after a natural disaster basically reduces the individuals’ liability
for the ﬁnancial damages and therefore sets incentives to underinsure or not insure at all.
Various authors have developed formal models derived from expected utility theory that
analyze these incentive structures and its eﬀects on individual insurance behavior. Lewis
& Nickerson (1989) and Kaplow (1991) were among the ﬁrst translating the idea that
people underinsure, because of expected governmental assistance into a formal model. In
a related paper Buchanan (1975) showed even earlier that the government is unable to
decline ﬁnancial assistance for the poor and termed this situation Samaritan’s Dilemma.
Based on this assumption, Coate (1995) created a model in which the amount of public
transfers depends on the degree of the potential victim’s insurance coverage. Arvan &
Nickerson (2000) and Arvan & Nickerson (2006) analyzed the incentive structure in a
game between potential victims and a social planner who is responsible for public assis-
tance. Similar to the work by Coate (1995) and Lewis & Nickerson (1989) they argue
that it is rational for individuals to underinsure given expected governmental assistance.
1Kunreuther (2006) argued that although studies revealed that individuals do not anticipate govern-
mental assistance, the broad media coverage on disaster assistance following hurricane Katrina could
change public views on this subject.
5Their explanation for this behavior, however, diﬀers from earlier papers as they endoge-
nized governmental compensation. An individual’s purchase of insurance coverage creates
negative externalities by reducing the uncovered part not only of the individual’s wealth,
but also of the uncovered property of all individuals at risk and therefore the fraction
eligible for governmental compensation. Underinsurance is a Nash-equilibrium among all
potential victims. Charity hazard can thus be explained through such an equilibrium
rather than the Samaritan’s Dilemma. Kelly & Kleﬀner (2003) developed a theoretical
framework analyzing the demand for insurance and mitigation measures if individuals
can expect governmental disaster relief. The numerical simulation shows that govern-
mental aid decreases the amount spent on insurance as well as mitigation measures. Kim
& Schlesinger (2005) introduced government guaranteed subsistence levels to a model of
insurance market with adverse selection. Governmental assistance can alter the set of
separating-equilibrium contracts. Depending on the level of relief, high-risk individuals
might fully insure whereby low-risk individuals might have incentives to rely on govern-
mental aid.
Empirical ﬁndings
The problem of charity hazard and its eﬀects on individual insurance behavior seem pretty
straightforward and convincing at least from a theoretical perspective. However, when
it comes to empirical evidence for this issue, only few empirical studies have analyzed
the eﬀect of governmental relief on disaster-insurance2. A study by Kunreuther, Gins-
berg, Miller, Slovic, Borkan & Katz (1978) revealed that the majority of homeowners
in hazard prone areas do not anticipate federal ﬁnancial disaster relief. The empirical
results by Browne & Hoyt (2000) oppose the idea of charity hazard. Their ﬁndings even
suggest a signiﬁcant positive correlation between the amount of governmental disaster
relief and the demand for ﬂood insurance in the USA. They argue that the exposure to
2An empirical study by Botzen, Aerts & van den Bergh (2009) ﬁnds that federal post-disaster compen-
sation can crowd out the incentive to mitigate damages via self-protection (e.g. sandbags, water resistant
ﬂoors).
6ﬂood risk might increase both the purchases of ﬂood insurance and the amount of gov-
ernmental aid received. Asseldonk, Meuwissen & Huirne (2002) measured the demand
for a hypothetical public-private crop insurance scheme by interviewing 305 crop produc-
ers in the Netherlands with the contingent-valuation method. The producer’s belief in
potential governmental disaster assistance had a signiﬁcant negative impact on the likeli-
hood to participate in the insurance program. Brunette, Cabantous, Couture & Stengar
(2008) conducted a laboratory experiment where the eﬀect of governmental compensa-
tion schemes3 with a ﬁxed amount of relief on participant’s willingness-to-pay for disaster
insurance was analyzed. They ﬁnd a crowding out eﬀect on insurance demand. However,
there was no uncertainty related to the amount and likelihood of compensation. The
purpose of that experiment to test the eﬀect of ’stylized programs used in the theoretical
literature’ rather than ’real life governmental assistance programs’.
This short overview on studies indicates that it is diﬃcult to support the theoretical
arguments for charity hazard with empirical evidence. First, there are only few empirical
studies that have dealt with this subject. Second, the main focus of these studies was on
other topics related to natural hazard insurance and incorporated governmental disaster
relief only as an additional control variable. Third, the results are contradicting and the
majority of studies actually reject the idea of charity hazard. This divergence between
theoretical predictions and empirical ﬁndings is the starting point of this paper. We
believe that some important variables for insurance demand and government relief so far
have been neglected. One missing variable, particularly addressed in this paper, is the
institutional design of governmental relief programs.
3 Institutional analysis
In Austria and Germany two diﬀerent forms of institutions for governmental ﬂood relief
can be observed. While in Austria the supply of ﬂood insurance is supplemented by a
3the treatments varied between, ﬁxed relief, relief conditional on insurance and subsidized premiums
7tax based catastrophe fund, Germany’s risk transfer is characterized by a pure market
solution with additional governmental ad hoc assistance. The two varying degrees of in-
stitutionalization might signal diﬀerent levels of ex-post security for potential insurance
holders and hence impact their demand for insurance respectively (e.g. Coate 1995). The
system promising the higher possibility of a governmental bail out is likely to be more
prone to the adverse eﬀect of charity hazard by oﬀering an increased incentive for a re-
duction of insurance demand.
The Austrian catastrophe fund
The Austrian catastrophe fund act including ﬂoods and other natural hazards was es-
tablished in 1966 after severe ﬂood events occurred in 1965 and 1966 in order to provide
ﬁnancial support for victims of natural hazards. To assure the ﬁnancing of the fund,
a markup was levied on the income tax, capital yields tax and corporate income tax
which generates ﬂuctuating takings dependent on the economic situation. Until 1996
high amounts of reserves were built due to the absence of severe natural hazard events.
In order to allow for the fungibility of these reserves a statue of its own was implemented
several times. For this reason a new catastrophe fund act which limits the reserves to a
maximum of 29 million Euros was established in 1996. In cases of extreme catastrophes
additional means were provided by the government. For example, the government allo-
cated an additional amount of 500 million Euros and 251 million Euros for the ﬂood events
in 2002 and 2005, respectively, whereby the relief in 2002 was to some extent ﬁnanced by
delaying a planned tax reduction. 4
Since the tax based catastrophe fund is in fact a form of enforced solidarity the ﬁnancing
of the catastrophe fund can be interpreted as a quasi compulsory insurance. However,
as opposed to insurance contracts the taxpayer does not have any legal rights to a risk
transfer in case of damage. For this reason the ex-post transfer is not to be considered as
4Moreover, Austria received 134 million Euro (2002) and 14.8 million Euro (2005) from the European
Union’s Solidarity Fund.
8indemniﬁcation payment but rather as relief. Once a ﬂood event occurs, the person con-
cerned has to apply for governmental relief. Since the ultimate authority for all decisions
concerning the catastrophe fund rests on the respective Federal States with each state
using its own directives, varying levels of governmental relief can be observed for com-
parable cases across Federal States (Prettenthaler & Vetters 2005). To be more precise,
directives for the permission of governmental relief do not exist in Tyrol to this date. The
commission calculates for each case individually the level of governmental relief based on
the amount of damage, the ﬁnancial circumstances, the ﬁnancial burden before the ﬂood
event and special burdens within the family. Insurance payments which the household
received are sub ducted. The compensation normally ranges between 20% and 30% of the
present value; in exceptional cases up to 80% (or even 100%) might be approved. The
Federal government carries 60% of this burden whereas the remaining 40% are paid by the
Federal State. Therefore, despite the lack of legal entitlement for governmental relief, the
Austrian catastrophe fund in its role as a well known persistent institution might induce
people to assume to receive relief; however the level of compensation remains insecure.
The German ad-hoc system of governmental relief
In contrast to Austria, governmental disaster assistance is not institutionalized in Ger-
many but rather approved discretionary. Garrett & Sobel (2003) suggest that govern-
mental assistance following a natural hazard event is highly politically motivated. To be
more precise, their results show that the rate of disaster declaration and the allocation
of disaster relief in the US by the FEMA are driven by presidential and congressional
considerations rather than by the need of people concerned. Consequently higher levels
of politicians’ generosity are to be expected in election years, since the re-election is at
stake. Anecdotal evidence from Germany further supports these ﬁndings: After severe
ﬂoods hit communities along the rivers Elbe and Danube in Germany in 2002, chan-
cellor Gerhard Schroeder who was running for re-election not only won the election by
promising a governmental emergency assistance amounting to 400 million Euros but also
9by visiting ﬂooded areas and speaking to the people concerned. The federal relief was
partly ﬁnanced by a delay of a planned tax cut. The low degree of institutionalization
does not aﬃrm people in Germany to expect governmental disaster assistance unless the
ﬂood event happens to interact with an election year. However, if that coincidence takes
places, the claimant might expect to receive a high level of compensation resulting from
the pledge of the politician.
The two forms of governmental relief in Austria and Germany induce diﬀerent degrees
of uncertainty regarding ex post ﬁnancial assistance. We exploit this diﬀerence for a
comparative institutional analysis in order to investigate which design of the relief system
has a larger crowding out eﬀect on private insurance demand. In other words: Does the
Austrian catastrophe fund oﬀering a high probability but a low level of coverage crowd
out the demand for ﬂood insurance more than the German ad hoc system with a low
probability but high level of coverage?
4 Charity hazard and the optimal insurance demand
We commence our examination with a theoretical analysis of the eﬀect of uncertainty in
governmental relief on insurance demand. The basic model of optimal insurance demand
which is based on the contributions of Mossin (1968) and Smith (1968) assumes a com-
petitive insurance market with fair premiums, a symmetric distribution of information as
well as risk averse and rational individuals.
In this model it is assumed that an individual has an initial wealth of W0 and is confronted
with two states of wealth: a situation with no disaster event W1 = W0 and a situation
with an occurrence of a disaster loss L, so that W2 = W0   L. Disaster losses happen
with a probability of . There exists an insurance market which oﬀers coverage I = L
at fair premiums P, where  deﬁnes the degree of insurance coverage, which can range
from  = 0 for no insurance coverage to  = 1 for full insurance coverage. Premiums are
called fair as they reﬂect expected payments P = I. With the opportunity to purchase
10insurance coverage, wealth in the no-loss situation becomes W1 = Wo   P and wealth in
the loss situation W2 = W0   P   Lnet where Lnet deﬁnes the diﬀerence between disaster
loss and insurance coverage. The expected utility for any   0 is given by
EUins = u(W0) + (1   )u(W0   P):
As shown by Mossin (1968)  = 1 is always the optimal choice for risk averse, rational
individuals as long as premiums are fair. Risk averse, rational individuals always try to
eliminate their risk and to equalize their wealth in both states by shifting wealth from
state 1 to state 2. If premiums are fair, individuals are maximizing their expected utility
by totally eliminating their risk.
4.1 Guaranteed but partial public compensation
In line with Kim & Schlesinger (2005), let us assume that government provides partial
relief S for losses caused by natural disasters, which are guaranteed and well known by
all individuals. The amount of relief S is given by
S = Sset   W2 for W2  Sset and
S = 0 for W2 > Sset :
Sset is the social standard of wealth in case a disaster occurs and is inﬂuenced by political
considerations. Sset guarantees that no one has to live below this level of social welfare.
If disaster losses decrease individual wealth below this social welfare standard, public
compensation S will guarantee wealth amounting to Sset: Public compensation S will
only be paid to households when personal wealth in state 2 is lower than the social
welfare standard (W2  Sset). Typically social standard can range between zero and a
full recovery of initial wealth. Therefore Sset can be written as Sset = W0; where  can
range between 0 and 1. If  = 0 governmental relief will be zero. If  = 1 than Sset is
equal to W0 so that the government will recover each personal initial wealth.
11As it is the case in Austria public reliefs are guaranteed but do not recover people’s initial
wealth completely, so that 0 <  < 1. A guaranteed full public coverage of disaster losses
would completely crowd out private insurance demand as it would be rational for any
individual to consume coverage for free rather than to pay premiums for it.5 However,
the question of our concern is: What impact does a guaranteed partial public coverage
have on private insurance? Does partial public coverage also eliminate incentives for
private insurance or does there exist a level of  without any crowding out eﬀect on
private insurance?
The choice either to insure or to rely on public relief depends on the corresponding beneﬁts.
There is a critical level of S
set where expected utility in a situation with public partial
relief equals expected utility with insurance coverage. As mentioned above, if individuals
decide to insure the optimal choice is full coverage with  = 1. If they decide to rely
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:
5Expected utility for full insurance coverage becomes EUins = u(W0) + (1   )u(W0   P) whereas
expected utility for costless and full public coverage is EUpub = u(W0): It is obvious that EUpub >
EUins regardless of the degree of personal risk aversion. This means that there is no reason for rational
individuals to purchase any insurance coverage.
6A rational decision can only be a choice between full insurance coverage or no insurance coverage
and public compensation. If individuals decide to rely on public coverage their wealth in state 2 will be
determined by Sset. Any partial insurance coverage that would lead to a wealth W2 below social standard
Sset would not be rational as social standard Sset could be reached for free. Any partial insurance coverage
that would lead to wealth W2 higher than social standard Sset wouldn’t be rational either as full private
insurance coverage with  = 1 would be the optimal choice for risk averse, rational individuals anyway.
12Apparently a crowding out eﬀect of private insurance depends on the level of public relief
coverage oﬀered by the government. If Sset > S
set, people do not insure anymore and
private insurance is totaly crowded out. Whereas if Sset < S
set people insure completely
against disaster losses and don’t rely on public compensation.
4.2 Guaranteed but random public compensation
As it is the case in Germany there is no established relief fund for disaster losses or any
other reliable public transfer system for disaster risks. But as Germany is - by constitution
- a welfare state, the state is expected to be an insurer of last resort. This means that there
will be public relief after a disaster as far as it is legitimized by social welfare concerns.
However, the level of public compensation is unknown ex ante and varies over time.
Assume that people cannot rely on a guaranteed level of public compensation Sset. Let
therefore Sset be a random variable  Sset. People build their expectations on the level of
public relief E(u( Sset)). Compared to the situation before, when Sset was guaranteed and
the level of compensation was ﬁxed and well known, the level now is insecure and will
therefore reduce utility for risk averse individuals. If the expected value of the random
compensation level E( Sset) is equal to the expected value of ﬁxed compensation level
E(Sset), the following inequation must hold for risk averse individuals:
u(E(Sset)) = u(E( Sset)) > E(u( Sset)):
In line with the deﬁnition for risk averse behavior this equation expresses risk averse
individuals beneﬁt more from any secure level of Sset than from an insecure level  Sset
provided that the expected value in both cases is the same. For instance, people have a
lower utility in case of an insecure compensation level with an expected value equal to S
set,
E( Sset) = S
set , so that u(S
set) > E(u( Sset)): In this case people are not indiﬀerent between
insurance and public compensation and will therefore buy insurance. No crowding out
takes place at any insecure level of public compensation that on average is S
set. Hence,
13people are indiﬀerent between insurance and public compensation if the average level of
random compensation E( Sset) is higher than S
set. Furthermore it follows, that a higher
variance of  Sset, or in other words, a more insecure  Sset leads to smaller crowding out of
insurance demand and therefore to a smaller charity hazard eﬀect.
The theoretical considerations implicate two results: First, in any design of governmental
relief program there will be a critical level of public compensation. Beyond this critical
level public compensation will signiﬁcantly impact private substitute markets negativly.
Second, this critical level decreases for a governmental relief program with secure and
reliable compensations in comparison to a relief scheme with insecure and variable public
compensations. That is to say in a reliable relief design less public compensation will
lead to a crowding out of private insurance demand than in an unrelaible one. As public
relief in Austria could be considered as reliable and secure, it is reasonable to assume that
crowding out of private insurance demand is more probable than in Germany where public
compensation is less secure and unreliable. Hence under ceteris paribus conditions the
charity hazard eﬀect should yield a lower insurance demand in Austria than in Germany.7
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Data
Our analysis on charity hazard is based on data collected in 2006 in the Austrian region
of Tyrol and the German region Upper-Bavaria. A randomized sample was drawn from
among the population in municipalities aﬀected by the 2005 ﬂoods. Telephone-interviews
were conducted to ask individuals about their personal experience with the 2005 ﬂood,
their WTP and general interest in disaster insurance. The survey in Tyrol contained 218
households, 72 of which were aﬀected by the heavy rain event of 2005. The 147 households
which suﬀered no damage in 2005 form a control group in the following analysis. The
7If we take into account the literature about ambiguity we can ﬁnd even more support for the theoreti-
cal ﬁndings above. Einhorn & Hogarth (1986) and Hogarth & Kunreuther (1989) showed that individuals
are ambiguity averse (e.g. individuals have higher WTP for insurance in ambiguous situations).
14results from Upper Bavaria are based on a survey conducted in the context of the MEDIS
project in collaboration with the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) Berlin
and the German Research Centre for Geosciences Potsdam (GFZ). In this case the survey
contained 305 households, all of which were aﬀected. Although the surveys in Austria
and Germany were conducted by two diﬀerent survey companies, the wording of the key
questions were identical. In fact, the survey in Tyrol was designed much as an international
comparative questionnaire to the MEDIS (MEDIS 2008) project’s survey.
Dependent variable:
The dependent variable is the respondent’s answer to the following open-ended valuation
question: "How much are you willing to pay for a full insurance coverage against natural
hazards?". This type of question of course bares the risk of strategic answering from
the respondent. The hypothetical private good at question (e.g. NATCAT insurance for
the respondent’s property) is basically an (imperfect) substitute for an existing publicly
provided good (e.g. governmental disaster relief). In addition, protest responses8 as a
result of dissension regarding some aspects of the study (e.g. the interviewee perceives
unfairness to pay for insurance after he has suﬀered severe losses from a recent ﬂood) or
the refusal to provide an answer due to some other circumstances (e.g. the traumatic
experiences from the ﬂood event cause an answer refusal) can threat the validity of the
contingent valuation studies. We deleted all observations that refused to give an answer
to the WTP-question, including those where the "don’t know"-option was chosen.
Independent variables:
The questionnaire further provides information about property owner’s disaster damage to
both housing and furniture during the 2005 ﬂood events. The interviewees were also asked
to reveal their perception of ﬂood risks for their property. In addition, the respondent’s
8For a detailed discussion of the problem of protest responses in contingent valuation studies see
Jorgensen, Syme, Bishop & Nancarrow (1999).
15should indicate if they consider ﬂood relief a governmental task or not. A number of
socio-economic characteristics (e.g. income, household size, sex) were also collected as
additional control variables. After removing all observations that had missing values for
the dependent or the explanatory variables the ﬁnal dataset consists of 223 observations.
Each questionnaire also included information on the country where the interview was
taken. Table 1 provides the summary statistics.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
5.2 Estimation method
In order to identify the determinants of the individual WTP for NATCAT insurance we
regress the reported WTP on a number of explanatory variables. A closer look at the
distribution of the dependent variable, reveals that a considerable fraction of respondents
have a zero WTP while the rest have a positive WTP. Econometric analysis of data with
such distributional features requires the application of alternatives to standard estima-
tion methods. Ordinary-least-squares (OLS)-estimator does not account for the censored
character of the sample and the resulting parameter estimates are both biased and incon-
sistent (Maddala 1983). In the case of a censored dependent variable Amemiya (1984)
suggests two types of Tobit models (Type 1 and 2). The Type 1 model is the standard To-
bit approach with left-censoring at zero. Type 2 models are a family of two-part models,
encompassing a standard two-part model and a sample-selection model. Type 2 models
would be the preferable if the WTP-question in our questionnaire was set-up as a pair of
questions. For example: The ﬁrst question is "Would you be willing to buy NATCAT-
insurance?". If this question is answered with "yes" then the follow-up question would be
the actual WTP question "What is your maximum WTP for a NATCAT-insurance pol-
icy?". However, our questionnaire included only one open-ended question for the WTP.
The dependent variable is clearly censored at zero because of the design of the payment
question. Zero values in our sample can consist of: First, true zeros, for people that live in
16areas that are not exposed to natural hazards. Second, protest respondents that answer
zero for strategic purposes (e.g. sending a signal to policy-makers that they prefer the
publicly provided federal relief to the private good "NATCAT insurance"). Third, protest
respondents that actually have a negative WTP and want in fact send an even stronger
strategic signal but are limited to the boundaries of the payment vehicle. Therefore, the
Type 1 Tobit model is the natural choice for our purposes. Although the standard Tobit
model assumes a normal distribution, WTP data is often better modeled as log-normal.
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Although Tobit estimates deliver consistent and unbiased results in the case of censored
data, the method is based on two distributional assumptions for the error term: normal-
ity and homoskedasticity. Non-normality is a particular problem and causes the Tobit
estimates to be inconsistent. To diagnose the validity of this assumption we apply an
parametric bootstrap version (Drukker 2002) of the conditional moment test proposed by
Skeels & Vella (1999).
17If the test rejects the null of normality we have to apply an alternative to the Tobit model.
Powell (1986) proposed a symmetrically censored least squares (SCLS) estimator that is
consistent for an non-normal and heteroskedastic error. This estimator has already been
applied to analyze the determinants of WTP by Kwak, Lee & Russell (1997). The SCLS
estimator overcomes the non-normality by ’artiﬁcially’ restoring the symmetry of the error
term via a symmetric trimming process. The initial censoring causes the dependent vari-
able to be asymmetrically distributed since the lower tail is censored at 0 while the upper
tail is ’piled up’ at a censoring point g, with g equal to the natural log of the maximum
WTP in our sample (Chay & Powell 2001). The basic idea is to restore symmetry by
recensoring the uncensored observations in the upper tail of the distribution. The error
term of the censored regression model has the form 
i = maxfi   x0
ig. The symmetric













In a similar fashion the dependent variable, yi will be replaced with minfyi;2x0
ig. See
appendix for a more detailed explanation of the SCLS estimator.
5.3 Results
Table 2 presents the results of our Tobit-estimates. Model 1 is the baseline regression,
indicating that higher income, a larger household and the individual assessment of the
ﬂood exposure have a signifcant positive eﬀect on the WTP for NATCAT insurance. This
is in line with previous ﬁndings in the literature (e.g. Browne & Hoyt 2000, Kunreuther
et al. 1978, Michel-Kerjan & Kousky 2010). The amount of experienced ﬂood damage,
sex and the control dummy for the August 2005 ﬂood do not appear to have a strong
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the WTP. Importantly, the average WTP of interviewees in Aus-
tria is lower than in Germany. Model 2 introduces the governmental task dummy. The
dummy is negative and highly signiﬁcant, therefore conﬁrming the general predictions of
18the charity hazard model. In the next step, we look at the eﬀect of individual experience
with governmental relief payments on the WTP (Model 3). The coeﬃcient is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 10 %-level. The coeﬃcient of the governmental task variable stays
positive and signiﬁcant and it’s size decreases only slightly. Model 4 adds an interaction
term between the governmental task variable and the country-dummy to the speciﬁcation.
The purpose is to test the key propositions of our theoretical model regarding the eﬀect of
diﬀerent degrees of certainty of public relief. The interaction term between governmental
task and Austria is our empirical proxy for governmnetal relief in an instituional environ-
ment, where compensation is guaranteed but partial. The reference group contains the
observations where compensation is random (e.g. Germany). The estimated coeﬃcient of
the interaction term has a negative sign and is signiﬁcant at least at the 10%-level. These
results indicate that, ceteris paribus, the crowding out eﬀect is larger in an institutional
environment where the probability of governmental relief is higher (e.g. Austria).
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The conditional moment tests, however, clearly reject the null of normality for all 4
speciﬁcations. The failure of the normality assumption yield our Tobit estimates to be
inconsistent. We therefore repeat the regressions using the SCLS estimator (Table 3).
All results are robust and the sign of the coeﬃcients stay the same. An increase in the
signiﬁcance of both the governmental task variable as well as the interaction term is a
sign for the strong support of our theoretical model.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
6 Conclusion
Can governmental disaster relief programs co-exist with market-based private insurance
against natural hazards? Basic rational choice theory tells us that both schemes are
substitutes from the standpoint of recipients so that a crowding out of natural hazard
19insurance will occur, which has also been termed ’charity hazard’. A closer look reveals
that the crowding out eﬀect on private insurance depends on the level of public relief
coverage and the certainty with which it is oﬀered by the government. The lower the level
of disaster relief and the more uncertain it is, the lesser is the danger of crowding out of
private insurance.
There are many ways of creating recipient expectations on the level of govermental relief
and its certainty. One way is to restrict the coverage within governmental programs to a
pre-deﬁned level, say a rate of 50-percent of actual damages or an amount ﬁxed below av-
erage damages. Another way is to subject aid to the discretionarity of public oﬃcials and
politicians on an ad hoc basis. Neither approach is convincing on a normative political-
economic basis, yet both can explain why we ﬁnd co-exsiting schemes of private natural
hazard insurance and government relief programmes in practice in many European coun-
tries and throughout the world. It can also explain why co-existing governmental relief
programs are not showing the expected signifcant demand decreasing eﬀect in the several
empirical studies. One missing variable in these studies are the institutional features or
the ’design’ of governmental relief programs as they are addressed in this paper. Based
on a comparative willingness-to-pay study for natural hazard insurance in Germany and
Austria we are able to show that an assured partial relief scheme (as in Austria) drives a
stronger crowding out of private insurance than an uncertain scheme of full relief (as in
Germany). Overall we ﬁnd that the design of governmental relief programs signiﬁcantly
impacts private substitute markets.
There is a strong call for public-private-partnership programs of risk transfer in a ’new
era of catastrophes’ (Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan 2009). There has been a consider-
able increase in the economic and insured damages caused by natural hazards over the
past thirty years (MunichRe GeoRisk 2007). This trend is likely driven by human-
impacted climate change as well as a growing accumulation of wealth in hazard-prone
areas (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007). Strenghening the role
of private insurers and incentivising strategies for the mitigation of risk are important
20challenges in the face of these developments. To avoid disincentives to mitigate (moral
hazard) and disincentives to insure (charity hazard) we need institutional designs that
allow for a combined public and private involvement. This challenge is far from being re-
solved, despite important world-wide eﬀorts to develop ’systemic’ approaches for natural
hazard risk transfer under (e.g. the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative). Our paper is a
ﬁrst step to study the interplay of private insurance and public relief programs in a frame-
work of existing institutions of natural hazard risk transfer. It needs to be complemented
by studies which address this issue from a normative legal and economic perspective as
outlined (e.g. Faure 2006, Nell & Richter 2005). Other lines of future research would
be to compare these ﬁndings from natural hazard insurance to general social insurance
programs where private and public institutions also co-exist.
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25Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
WTP 223 44.772 61.643 0 500
Income 223 2044.318 795.981 500 3000
Damage Flood 223 17711.200 51522.410 0 420000
Perception of 223 3.800 1.941 1 6
ﬂood risk
Female 223 0.541 0.499 0 1
Austria 223 0.291 0.455 0 1
Government Task 223 0.218 0.414 0 1
26Table 2: Determinants of WTP for NATCAT-
insurance - Tobit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(Income) 0:660 0:737 0:743 0:762
(0:286) (0:275) (0:273) (0:270)
Household size 0:383 0:318 0:323 0:337
(0:173) (0:166) (0:167) (0:163)
ln(Damage) 0:041 0:033 0:018 0:015
(0:031) (0:029) (0:031) (0:031)
Female 0:104 0:008  0:018 0:002
(0:239) (0:224) (0:220) (0:219)
Perception of 0:201 0:170 0:172 0:172
Flood Risk (0:070) (0:066) (0:065) (0:065)
Flood August  0:143  0:205  0:315  0:386
(0:251) (0:239) (0:256) (0:255)
Austria  0:969  0:936  0:955  0:703
(0:373) (0:360) (0:354) (0:366)






Constant  3:722  3:607  3:606  3:809
(2:227) (2:117) (2:105) (2:082)
F-Stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2a 0.229 0.311 0.317 0.330
CM-Testb 88.826*** 27.416*** 28.153*** 40.542***
N 223 223 223 223
Notes: Coeﬃcients reported. Dependent variable is Ln(WTP). aCox-
Snell R2. b Conditional moment test for non-normality based on Skeels
& Vella (1999). The null is that the underlying disturbances are nor-
mally distributed. The test statistics developed by Drukker (2002) is
applied. ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10%, respec-
tively.
27Table 3: Determinants of WTP for NATCAT-
insurance - SCLS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(Income) 0:746 0:498 0:483 0:651
(0:216) (0:202) (0:192) (0:219)
Household size 0:346 0:323 0:330 0:352
(0:147) (0:146) (0:139) (0:135)
ln(Damage) 0:035  0:015 0:042  0:019
(0:025) (0:021) (0:025) (0:024)
Female 0:189 0:031 0:103  0:160
(0:190) (0:174) (0:191) (0:192)
Perception of 0:160 0:154 0:051 0:186
Flood Risk (0:055) (0:055) (0:060) (0:057)
Flood August  0:402  0:339  0:358  0:338
(0:218) (0:178) (0:217) (0:214)
Austria  0:738  0:620  0:798  0:494
(0:256) (0:255) (0:302) (0:283)






Constant  4:008  1:403  1:485  2:752
(1:597) (1:454) (1:407) (1:698)
N 223 223 223 223
Notes: Coeﬃcients reported. Dependent variable is ln(WTP).
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (No. of bootstrap






Income + Respondent’s net income.
Household size + Number of people in the respondent’s household
Damage Flood +/- Damage to respondent’s property
in tsd. caused by the 2005 ﬂoods
Flood August +/- Dummy=1 if respondent was aﬀect by the ﬂood
in tsd. in August 2005, 0 if respondent was aﬀected by other
ﬂood event in 2005
Perception of + Respondent’s assessment of ﬂood exposure; 1=low,
ﬂood risk 6=high.
Relief Experience +/- Dummy=1 if respondent received some federal ﬂood
relief; 0 otherwise.
Austria - Dummy=1 if interview was conducted
in Austria; 0 Germany.
Government Task - Dummy=1 if respondent considers ﬂood relief
a governmental task; 0 otherwise.
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